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THE ECONOMICALLY
DISADVANTAGED AND THE ADA:
WHY ECONOMIC NEED SHOULD
FACTOR INTO THE MITIGATING
MEASURES DISABILITY ANALYSIS
"I did my job when I was called on by my country. Now it is your
job and the job of everyone in Congress to make sure that when I
lost the use of my legs I didn't lose my ability to achieve my
dreams. 1
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19902 ("ADA") was en-
acted to provide people with disabilities with the opportunity to
achieve their dreams and integrate into the mainstream of American
society and the workforce. 3 Historically, people with disabilities
faced barriers to integration and also tended to be much poorer than4
the rest of Americans. While the ADA was passed to assist with this
integration, to eliminate economic dependency, and to "provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities," 5 people with dis-
abilities still lag behind non-disabled persons both in obtaining em-
ployment and in earnings despite the past decade of economic pros-
perity.6 Former President Clinton summed up this employment di-
vide when he stated: "Not everyone has shared in the American eco-
nomic renaissance. We all know there are people.., who have been
left behind, including millions of Americans with significant disabili-
ties who want to go to work."7
I H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 49 (1990) (quoting Perry Tillman, a Vietnam veteran).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (Supp. V 1999).
3 See id. § 12101.
4 See id.; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43-47.
5 42U.S.C. §12101(b)(1) (1994).
6 See E. Scott Reckard, Disabled are Behind in Economic Boom, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2000, at Al.
7 id.
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Unfortunately, the courts' interpretation of the ADA has not as-
sisted people with disabilities in their fight to enter the workforce. In
1999, 95% of all litigated ADA claims in which a decision was issued
ended in defeat for the disability plaintiff.8 The Supreme Court's de-
cision in the seminal case of Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,9 which
narrowed the scope of the ADA, is a new obstacle to the ADA plain-
tiff. The Sutton Court held that if a person was utilizing mitigating
measures to correct a physical or mental impairment, that individual
must be evaluated in his mitigated state 0 for purposes of determining
the existence of a disability under Title I of the ADA.' A person with
an impairment does not fall within ADA protection unless the im-
pairment "substantially limits one or more of [one's] major life activi-
ties.' 12 In other words, a person with a disability must have an im-
pairment, but not all impaired persons have a disability as defined by
the ADA. The severity of the impairment determines if one has a dis-
ability, and the use of corrective measures can determine the severity.
For example, to determine if a hearing impaired person who uses a
hearing aid has a disability, his impaired hearing must be evaluated
with regard to the use of the hearing aid. Prior to the Sutton decision,
most jurisdictions would have made this determination without regard
to the use of a hearing aid, making it much easier to establish a dis-
ability.13 Consequently, disability advocates were dismayed after Sut-
8 See Claudia MacLachlan, Employers Winning ADA Suits, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 2000, at
B1. It should be noted, however, that this figure only relates to litigated cases in which a deci-
sion was issued and does not include settled cases, for which there are no statistics. See id. It is
likely that the number of ADA plaintiffs who receive favorable settlements is much higher.
9 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
10 The court specifically held that "the determination of whether an individual is disabled
should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's impairment." Id. at
475.
1 The ADA defines a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). Ma-
jor life activities include seeing, hearing, walking, speaking, learning, breathing, and performing
manual tasks. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1994). While it is not entirely clear if working qualifies as
a major life activity, the Supreme Court has suggested that if a plaintiff is alleging that work is
the major life activity, the plaintiff must show that his disability precludes him from working in
a broad class of jobs and not just one particular job. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. To state a prima
facie claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that: (1) he was disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) he was a quali-
fied individual, i.e., able to perform the essential functions of the position with or without rea-
sonable accommodation; and (3) he was discharged because of his disability. See Criado v.
IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1998); Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506,
511 (1st Cir. 1996). This Note, however, focuses on the first prong of the disability determina-
tion in the employment context-that he was disabled under the meaning of the Act.
32 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A) (1994).
13 Prior to the Sutton decision, eight circuits interpreted the ADA as requiring an evalua-
tion of an impairment in its unmitigated state, in which case courts would not have had to deal
with inability to afford mitigating measures. See Lauren J. McGarity, Disabling Corrections and
Correctable Disabilities: Why Side Effects Might Be the Saving Grace of Sutton, 109 YALE L.J.
1034 [Vol. 52:1033
2002] THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED AND THE ADA 1035
ton about the adverse effect of this narrowed scope on people with
disabilities. 14
The Court's decision in Sutton, however, did not address the
situation in which the scientific technology exists to mitigate an im-
pairment but the employee cannot afford to utilize the mitigating
measures.IS Consider, for example, that 20 million Americans have a
hearing impairment.' 6 An average hearing aid costs $971,17 and many
insurance plans do not cover hearing aids. 18 Additionally, many types
of hearing loss require two hearing aids 19 or more expensive hearing
aids that range from $2,000 to $5,000 each. Moreover, among hear-
ing-impaired people ages 18-44, over 5% have annual incomes be-
tween $10,000 and $24,999, 2° while among those ages 45-64, 14.6%
1161, 1168 n.41 (2000) (citing eight circuits which considered an impairment in its unmitigated
state prior to the Sutton decision).
See Lisa Eichorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statu-
tory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1071, 1120 (1999) ("Congress's originally intended reach has been
so narrowed by [Sutton] that it is now incumbent upon Congress to amend the ADA to reflect its
originally intended scope."); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About it?, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000) ("[I1n Sutton, a seven-person majority of the Supreme Court ruled
that mitigating measures should be taken into account in determining whether an individual has
a disability-in direct contravention of both the legislative history to the ADA and the laws
implementing regulatory guidance.'); Scott E. Ferrin, Seeing Through a Glass Darkly: The
Supreme Court's Narrowed Definition of Disability, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 221 (2000) (not-
ing that Sutton determined that people who have correctable disabilities are no longer consid-
ered disabled); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpreta-
tions ofthe Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 139-140 (2000) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court ignored the legislative history and plain meaning of the ADA in
narrowing its scope).
15 This Note does not address an employee who chooses not to utilize mitigating measures
because of the negative side effects of the mitigating measures. For a discussion of this topic,
see Joshua C. Dickinson, Will the Supreme Court Allow Employers to Consider Reasonable
Mitigating Measures Not Presently Utilized by Employers When Determining Whether a Dis-
ability'Exists Under Section A of the ADA?, 68 Mo.-KC. L. REV. 389 (2000). See also Brian
T. Rabineau, Those With Disabilities Take Heed: Eighth Circuit Suggests That ADA May Not
Protect Those Who Fail To Control a Controllable Disability, 65 MO. L. REV. 319 (2000),
(discussing an 8th Circuit case holding that one who fails to mitigate a controllable disability
may not "warrant protection under the ADA.").
'6 NAT'L CTR FOR HEALTH STAT., SERIES 10, No. 188, VIrAL AND HEALTH STATiS-
TICS: PREVALENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS WITH HEARING TROUBLE: UNITED
STATFs, 1990-91, at 24-25 tbl. 1 (1994) [hereinafter persons with hearing trouble].
17 See 145 CONG. REC. E1372 (daily ed. June 23, 1999) (statement of Rep. Morella).
This figure is from 1997.
18 See generally Hearing Aid Insurance Poll, at http://www.listen-up.org/poll.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2002) (stating that results of an informal poll of 133 adults and children with
hearing loss showed that although 98% of those polled had health insurance, 48% of the health
insurance plans did not cover hearing aids); Insurance and Hearing Aids: Trying to Get a Ne-
cessity Covered, at http:llwww.deafness.abouLcomllibrary/weekly/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002)
(stating that health insurance companies have "largely refused" to cover hearing aids).
19 See American Academy of Audiology, Consumer Resources, at
http'//www.audiology.orgconsumerlwyskahl.php (ast visited Feb. 25, 2002) (stating that "[tihe
need for one hearing aid or two should be determined by you and your audiologist").
20 id.
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have annual incomes ranging from $10,000 to $24,999.2 Therefore,
a person with a hearing impairment might not be able to afford a hear-
ing aid.
This issue is not limited, however, to the hearing impaired com-
munity. It is estimated that 50 million Americans suffer from a dis-
ability.22 Many of these people, such as epileptics and diabetics, de-
pend on expensive prescription drugs to treat their impairment. Addi-
tionally, as of 1997, there were 43.4 million uninsured Americans.
Even among those with health insurance, premiums are rising, which
may result in reduction in the scope of coverage or even loss of cov-
erage.24 Moreover, people with disabilities are twice as likely as non-
disabled persons to delay getting needed health care because they
cannot afford it.2 Therefore, inability to pay for mitigating measures
is a potential problem; the solution that this Note proposes is to
evaluate an economically disadvantaged ADA plaintiff in his unmiti-
gated state.
This raises three legal issues. First, because most courts have
not directly addressed economic inability to utilize mitigating meas-
ures, they have no precedent or reasoning to guide them as to why
economic hardship might justify evaluating the employee in his un-
mitigated state.26 Second, even if courts are convinced that economic
status should be considered, they need guidance in determining who
is economically disadvantaged. Third, there are implications of con-
sidering economic status in the disability determination. For example,
does this provide incentives not to utilize mitigating measures? Is it
fair for an economically needy person with epilepsy, evaluated in his
unmitigated state, to be found to have a disability, while a person with
epilepsy, who can afford his medication, is evaluated in the mitigated
state and found not to be disabled? As a society, do we want to force
someone to sell his car and take public transportation so that he can
afford a mitigating device? Conversely, should someone who leases a
sport utility vehicle, has two televisions and cable television, but who
21 See id.
22 See Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, Assistive Technology Patenting Trends
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 BEHAV. SCL. & L. 47, 67 (1999) (stating that based
on current Census Bureau estimates, over 50 million Americans have a disability). While the 50
million figure is larger than the 43 million people with disabilities that the ADA refers to, the 50
million figure is based upon Census estimates. See id. While the article does not explain the
basis for the estimate, it is logical to assume that it is based on expected population growth.
' CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STAT. ABSTRACT NO. 185 (119th ed. 1999).
24 See discussion infra Part I.C.
25 id.
26 Until the Sutton decision, many courts did not have to deal with the issue of whether a
plaintiff could afford to pay for corrective devices because many courts followed the EEOC
Guidelines and made the disability determination with regards to the employee's unmitigated
state. See McGarity, supra note 13, at 1168 nA1.
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claims he cannot afford to utilize a mitigating measure, be considered
economically disadvantaged? Do we want someone to take a second
mortgage out on his home so that he can afford a corrective device?
Should someone have to apply for an assistive technology loan in or-
der to utilize mitigating measures?27
In addressing all three issues, this Note has two goals. First, this
Note argues that economic inability to utilize mitigating measures is a
justifiable reason for considering one in his unmitigated state when
making an ADA disability determination. The Supreme Court's Sut-
ton decision, federal appellate decisions alluding to the existence of
justifiable reasons for evaluating a plaintiff in his unmitigated state,
the text and legislative history of the ADA, and the ADA's undue
hardship defense for the employer all support this conclusion. Addi-
tionally, the one court, thus far, to confront a plaintiffs inability to
pay for mitigating measures held that it would evaluate the plaintiff in
his unmitigated state.2
Furthermore, consideration of economic need in the disability
analysis will balance the ADA's goal of removing barriers to the la-
bor market for people with disabilities with the goal of protecting em-
ployers and the courts from a flood of frivolous lawsuits. This is true
because only people who are truly economically disadvantaged will
be able to claim economic need, and they are the people most likely
to face external barriers to employment beyond their disability.
Next, this Note proposes an analytical framework adopted from
the in forma pauperis proceeding to determine if one is economically
disadvantaged in the ADA disability determination. The factors in
this analysis include the extent of the plaintiffs financial resources,
the proportion of the plaintiffs resources that must be expended to
utilize mitigating measures, the cost of the mitigating measure re-
quired, and any special circumstances which support a finding of eco-
nomic need.
This Note addresses the legal issues in four sections. Part I dis-
cusses the potential problem of inability to afford mitigating measures
in light of the historic economic challenges faced by people with dis-
abilities, skyrocketing health insurance premiums, and the number of
uninsured Americans. Part II presents legal support for considering
economic status in the ADA disability determinations, including Sut-
ton, federal appellate cases, and the text and intent of the ADA. Part
III discusses the possible models that the court can use to determine
27 These questions arose during an August 2000 conversation with Sharona Hoffman,
Assistant Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
28 See Haworth v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., No. Civ.A. 97-2149-EEO, 1998 WL
231062 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 1998).
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economic need, including the Food Stamp Program, Section 8 hous-
ing, and the ADA undue hardship and in forma pauperis analyses.
Finally, Part IV proposes an analytical framework based on the in
forma pauperis balancing approach for assessing economic disadvan-
tage. It also addresses the implications of considering economic
status in disability determinations, including an employer's duty to
provide a reasonable accommodation and possible unfair results to
ADA litigants.
I. BACKGROUND: THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF PEOPLE WITH
DIsABILrIEs
Approximately one in five Americans has some kind of disabil-
ity, and one in ten has a severe disability.2 9 Historically, persons with
disabilities have faced physical, attitudinal, educational, and eco-
nomic challenges to integration into mainstream society.30 Title I of
the ADA reflects Congress's recognition of these economic and em-
ployment challenges.31
A. General Economic Challenges and Unmet Need for Assistive
Technology
The general economic and employinent challenges facing people
with disabilities are illustrated in the results of a recent survey indicat-
ing that nationwide, of people with disabilities ages 18-64 who are
able to work despite their disabilities, 56% work full or part-time as
compared with 81% of the non-disabled population in the same age
bracket.32 Moreover, over two-thirds of these unemployed people
with disabilities would like to be working.33 Furthermore, 29% of
people with disabilities live in households with annual incomes of
$15,000 or less as compared to 10% of people without disabilities. 34
Additionally, only 16% of people with disabilities are likely to live in
households with greater than $50,000 annual income as compared to
29 CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. CENBR/97-5, CENSUS BRIEF
(1997) [hereinafter CEN BRIEF 97-5]. The U.S. Census defines a disability as difficulty seeing,
hearing, talking, walking, climbing stairs, lifting, carrying, working at a job and around the
house, or has difficulty performing activities of daily living. A severe disability is defined as an
inability to perform one or more activities, using an assistive device to get around, or needing
assistance from another person to perform basic activities. Id. It should be noted that this is
different from the ADA definition of a disability, which defines a disability in terms of an "im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 42
U.S.C. § 12102(A) (1994).
30 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, supra note 4, at 43-47.
31 See 42 U.S.C.§ 12101 (1994).
32 See Executive Summary of the 2000 N.O.D./Harris Survey of Americans With Disabili-
ties, at http://www.nod.orglhs2000.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2000) (on file with author).
33 id.
34 id
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39% of people without disabilities.35 Moreover, the survey indicated
that people with disabilities are twice as likely as people without dis-
abilities to delay getting needed health care because they cannot af-
ford it.36 This is not surprising given their low incomes and the fact
that a 1997 U.S. Census Brief survey indicates that 81.3% of people
with a disability surveyed did not receive Supplementary Security
Income ("SSI"), food stamps, or other cash assistance, while 81.4%
did not receive Social Security benefits.37
While people with disabilities are equally as likely as non-
disabled people to have health insurance of some kind, 28% of people
with disabilities have a special need that is not covered by their health
insurance compared with 7% of persons without a disability.
38
Therefore, combined factors such as low income, lack of com-
prehensive health insurance, and the high costs of many medications
or other corrective devices, may make corrective measures unafford-
able for a person with a disability. This fact is borne out by the results
of another survey that indicate that 1.2 million Americans of working
ages 25-64 have an unmet need for assistive technology ("AT") de-
vices such as motorized and customized wheelchairs, augmentative
communication devices, vehicle modifications, computer equipment,
assistive listening devices, home modifications, work-site modifica-
tions, and classroom modifications.39 Moreover, 48% of Americans
who use AT devices or who have a household member who uses AT
devices paid for the AT without help from social service agencies or
35 Id.
36 id.
37 Berven & Blanck, supra note 22, at 66. See also CEN BRIEF 97-5, supra note 29, at I
(reporting that 77.74% of Americans age 22 to 64 with disabilities do not receive public assis-
tance). This person would not be able to collect Social Security or SSI disability benefits be-
cause, although disabled, he is still qualified to work. In order to receive disabled worker's
benefits under Social Security, one must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity,
where gainful activity is defined as "work performed for remuneration or profit; or work of a
nature generally performed for remuneration or profit; or work intended for profit, whether or
not a profit is realized." 1997 SOCIAL SECURITYHANDBOOK § 603 (13th ed. 1997). This defini-
tion of disability also applies to eligibility for the SSI benefits program. Id at § 507. The fed-
eral appellate courts have recently held that a person who is considered disabled for Social
Security purposes and collects Social Security or SSI disability benefits may still bring a disabil-
ity suit under Title I of ADA. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
However, given that SSI income is only of "minimal decency or minimal subsistence:' R.
George Wright, Persons With Disabilities and the Meaning of Constitutional Equal Protection,
60 OHIO ST. LJ. 145, 154 (1999) (citations omitted), it is still possible that one would not be
able to afford to utilize corrective measures.
38 Executive Summary of 2000 N.O.D/Harris Survey of Americans With Disabilities, at
http'//www.nod.orgths2000.htmi (last visited Oct. 24,2000) (on file with author).
39 Berven & Blanck, supra note 22, at 48. AT is defined as "any item, piece of equipment
or product system, whether acquired commercially off the shelf, modified, or customized, that is
used to increase or improve the functional capabilities of individuals with disabilities." See id.
(citing Technology Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
218, 108 Stat. 50 (1994)).
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third parties, and more than 75% of persons with home modifications
or accessibility features paid for them out of pocket. 
40
B. Economic Problems in the Context of the Hearing Impaired
Community
The hearing impaired community provides an example of the
economic disadvantages that many people with disabilities face. Ap-
proximately 20 million persons, or 8.6% of the total U.S. population 3
years and older, have hearing impairments.4 ' Of this number,
10,598,000 are of working ages 18-64.42 More important, of persons
with a hearing impairment ages 18-44, 5.6% have an annual family
income of $10,000 or less, while 5.1% have a family income in the
range of $10,000 to $24,999.43 Of hearing impaired persons ages 45-
64, 19.1%, have an annual family income of $10,000 while 14.6%,
have an annual family income of $10,000 to $24,999. 44 The U.S. fed-
eral poverty threshold for a family of four is an annual income of
$17,000. Therefore, many people with hearing impairments live in
poverty.
In light of these statistics, consider that an average hearing aid
costs $97145 and lasts approximately 5 years.46 Moreover, many hear-
ing impaired people have hearing loss in both ears and need two hear-
ing aids to correct their impairments.47 Further exacerbating the prob-
lem is the fact that most private and employer-provided insurance
plans do not cover the costs of hearing exams or hearing aids. There-
fore, many working people with moderate incomes may not be able to
afford hearing aids.
C. Uninsured Americans and Skyrocketing Health Insurance
Premiums
The economic problems facing people with disabilities are also
magnified in light of the fact that 43.4 million Americans are unin-
40 See id. at 66. The authors also state that poor people are twice as likely to need AT
devices and that non-whites are more likely than whites to have an unmet need for AT. Id.
41 PERSONS wrrH HEARING TROUBLE, supra note 16, at 24-25 thl. 1.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 29-30, tbl. 4.
44 Id.
41 145 CONG. REC. E1372 (daily ed. June 23, 1999) (statement of Rep. Morella). It should
be noted, however, that not all persons with a hearing impairment will be helped by the use of a
hearing aid and these people may require additional or different AT, such as cochlear implants.
46 American Academy of Audiology, Frequently Asked Questions About Hearing Aids, at
http://www.audiology.org/consumer/hafaq (last visited Oct. 24,2000).
47 See American Academy of Audiology, Consumer Resources, at http://www.audiol-
ogy.orglconsumer/wyskahl/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2000).
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sured. 48 Of the 43.4 million, 32.4 million are of working age,49 and as
such may be subject to ADA protection.50 Additionally, some assis-
tive technologies such as hearing aids and cochlear implants are not
covered by most insurance plans.51 So, even if an employee does
have insurance, the policy may not cover a needed AT device.
Rising health insurance premiums also have the potential to
make previously affordable corrective measures unaffordable because
of a loss in coverage or because of higher insurance premiums. A re-
cent report indicated that employer-provided insurance policy premi-
ums have either risen 10 to 30% in the past year or are predicted to
rise 10 to 30% this year.52  Furthermore, a September 2000 national
survey of small businesses by the National Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Association and the Employee Benefits Research Institute
found that of companies with 100 employees or fewer, one in seven
said they would drop health insurance if premiums increased by 10
percent, while 46% said they would reduce the scope of their cover-
age. For a person with a disability who is already struggling eco-
nomically, rising insurance premiums and the corresponding reduc-
tion in the scope of coverage or loss of coverage53 could have devas-
tating consequences. For example, many people with disabilities such
as epilepsy, diabetes, or high blood pressure are able to control their
disabilities through medication. But if employers start limiting the
scope of coverage or dropping coverage altogether, many people with
48 CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFLABOR, STAT. ABsTRAcrNo.127 (119th ed. 1999).
49 Id.
" Title I prohibits disability-based discrimination in the employment context. See 42
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994) (stating that it is the purpose of the chapter to provide a mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities).
51 The cost of cochlear implant surgery is $40,000, but many insurance companies do not
pay because of a lack of data on the benefits. See, e.g., Cochlear Implants Worth the Money for
Deaf Children, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Aug. 16, 2000, at A3; Elizabeth Foster, Co-
chlear Implants: Thousands Unserved, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2000, at Z4 (noting that "private
insurance often fails to cover hospitals' costs for cochlear implant systems").
52 Sam Howe Verhovek, Frustration Grows With Cost of Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2000, at Abs. 1. See also Paul Duggan & Susan Levine, Health Care Costs Will Pinch
Employers; Insurance Squeeze Also to Hit Workers, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2000, at Al (re-
porting that various employers have recently raised or will raise the premiums on the health
insurance coverage provided to employees by 10 to 40%); Katherine Swartz, Op-Ed, Making
Health Insurance Affordable, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2000, at A19 (noting that "insurers
have announced premium increases of 10-30 percent").
53 An employer can elect to suspend all prescription drug coverage so long as he does so
with regard to all prescription drugs, without violating the ADA. See EEOC Interim Guidance
on Application of ADA to Health Insurance, 3 EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) No. 176, at
2301-08 (June 8, 1993) (noting that "[u]niversal limits or exclusions from coverage of all ex-
perimental drugs and/or treatments ... are... not... distinctions based on disability").
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previously correctable disabilities may then be unable to utilize miti-
gating measures.54
II. WHY ECONOMIC NEED IS A JUSTIFIABLE REASON TO EVALUATE
AN ADA PLAINTIFF IN HIS UNMITIGATED STATE
It is not enough to say that many people with disabilities may ask
to be evaluated in the unmitigated state because they cannot afford to
utilize mitigating measures. The courts also need solid legal support
as to why economic need is a justifiable reason to evaluate an ADA
plaintiff in his unmitigated state. While the Supreme Court and most
federal courts have not directly addressed this issue, there are several
reasons why economic status should be considered in the ADA dis-
ability evaluation.
A. Sutton Decision
The Supreme Court held in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.55 that
the determination of whether one is disabled under the ADA must be
made with regard to corrective measures such as medication, eye-
glasses, and hearing aids. 6 In Sutton, two sisters with visual myopia
sued United Airlines after they were rejected as pilots because their
uncorrected vision did not meet United's minimum vision standard.57
The sisters alleged that United rejected them based on their disability,
or in the alternative, rejected them because it regarded them as dis-
abled.58 In order to proceed on the disability claim, the sisters had to
show that they met the ADA definition of disabled.59 The sisters ar-
gued that although they used corrective eyewear, they should have
been evaluated in their unmitigated state.60 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower courts' rulings and held that the sisters had not met
54 These employees may, however, be protected under the "record of' prong of the ADA.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994) (stating that disability means a record of such impairment).
But many employees do not notify their employees about impairments such as diabetes or high
blood pressure because they have no need to as long as their insurance covers the medications
needed to mitigate the impairments. Therefore, they would not satisfy the "record of' prong.
See Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a record of
impairment was not shown where there was no evidence in the personnel file showing that the
employer's breast cancer affected her position and where she never missed a day of work).
55 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
56 See id. at 476 (stating that the district court found that "[b]ecause petitioners could fully
correct their visual impairments, the court held that they .. had not stated a claim that they
were disabled within the meaning of the ADA").
57 Id. at 475-76.
" Id. at 476.
59 The ADA defines a disability as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
60 Sutton, 527 U.S. at481.
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the "disabled" or "regarded as disabled" definition of the ADA be-
cause their vision was fully corrected through the use of corrective
eyewear.
61
Although the Court was silent as to inability to afford corrective
measures, its language and rationale imply that inability to pay for
mitigating measures is a reason to evaluate a plaintiff in his unmiti-
gated state. First, the Court expressly stated that "if a person is taking
measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment,
the effects of those measures... must be taken into account." 62 Be-
cause the Court did not state that consideration should be given to
mitigating measures whenever measures are medically available, re-
gardless of whether they are practically available, the logical infer-
ence is that consideration of mitigating measures is limited to those
plaintiffs who are actually utilizing them.
Furthermore, in explaining its decision, the Court stated that "a
person must be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-
substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A disability
exists only where an impairment substantially limits, not where it
'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating
measures were not taken." 63 By extension, disability must also exist
where the impairment substantially limits the plaintiff because he
cannot afford to take mitigating measures, not where the impairment
"might not," "could not," or "would not" be substantially limiting if
mitigating measures could be taken.
Moreover, the Court also emphasized that the ADA's disability
defimition demands an individualized inquiry into the particular ef-
fects of the impairment on the individual's major life activities. 64
This individualized inquiry should encompass consideration of one's
economic ability to utilize mitigating measures, because this partly
controls the impairment's effect on the individual's major life activi-
ties. Additionally, because consideration of an individual's ability to
afford corrective measures focuses on the individual's actual situa-
tion, and the actual effects of the impairment, rather than generaliz-
ing, this consideration of economic status achieves the goal of indi-
vidualized inquiry.
Also, to the extent that the Court was motivated by a concern
that a broad interpretation of the ADA disability definition would re-
61 Jd. at 477.
62 Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
63 Id.
6 Id. at 483. The Court stressed that "[tihe use or nonuse of a corrective device does not
determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limita-
tions an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting.' Id. at
488.
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sult in a flood of frivolous lawsuits, 65 consideration of economic need
as an exception to evaluating one in his mitigated state would not re-
sult in an overwhelming increase in ADA lawsuits. The Sutton deci-
sion did not preclude future ADA lawsuits from being filed. Rather, it
may have shifted the focus of the lawsuits to the "regarded as" and
"record of' disability causes of action.66 Additionally, ADA plaintiffs
may still argue that their corrective measures are not corrective
enough, and that they are still substantially limited in a major life ac-
tivity. Therefore, non-impoverished ADA plaintiffs have these ave-
nues of litigation open to them and would not need to rely on a false
claim of economic need.
B. Lower Court Decisions Regarding Justifiable Reasons Not to
Utilize Mitigating Measures
One court has directly confronted the issue of economic status as
a justifiable reason not to utilize mitigating measures in an ADA
case.67 Haworth v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co.68 involved
a forklift operator who suffered from cervical radiculopathy,69 but did
not regularly buy his prescribed medication or receive epidural blocks
due to a lack of health insurance and limited financial resources. Af-
ter he was fired, he sued his former employer under Title I of the
ADA. Procter & Gamble moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Haworth did not have an impairment that substantially limited a ma-
jor life activity because he sporadically used medication that miti-
gated his impairment.
In deciding the case, the court noted:
65 See id. at 483. The Court stated that a bright line rule requiring that persons be judged
in their unmitigated state would run counter to the ADA's mandated individualized inquiry
because this blanket approach "would often require courts and employers to speculate about a
person's condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination
based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals,
rather than on the individual's actual condition." Id.
6 See 42 U.S.C.§I2102(2)(B)-(C) (1994) (stating that the term disability means a record
of or being regarded as having such an impairment).
67 Prior to the Sutton decision, eight circuits interpreted the ADA as requiring an evalua-
tion of an impairment in its unmitigated state, in which case courts would not have had to deal
with inability to afford mitigating measures. See McGarity, supra note 13, at 1168 n.41 (citing
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Washington v. HCA Health
Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-471 (5th Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,
863 (1st Cir. 1998); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W Con-
tracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362,
366 (9th Cir. 1996)). But now that the Supreme Court has held that mitigating measures must be
considered, courts are likely to have to deal with this issue.
68 No. Civ.A. 97-2149-EEO, 1998 WL 231062, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 1998).
69 Cervical radiculopathy is a condition that causes inflammation in neck muscles and
tissues and a consequent loss of mobility. Id. at *3.
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It is an undisputed fact, for purposes of summary judg-
ment, that plaintiff, due to lack of income and health insur-
ance, has often gone months without adequate medication,
and has put off additional doctor's treatments such as epidu-
ral blocks. Thus, the facts do not support the conclusion that
plaintiff "utilized" corrective measures. Sutton does not di-
rectly address the situation presented here. We hesitate to
read Sutton as broadly as defendant, and therefore cannot
conclude, as defendant does, that the holding in Sutton "con-
clusively establishes" that plaintiff does not have a disabil-
ity.70
The court, however, granted summary judgment to Procter &
Gamble "[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, because plaintiff has failed
... to meet his burden to present evidence from which a jury could
conclude that the plaintiff is significantly restricted in his ability to
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." 71
Since Haworth did not meet his burden of proof, the court did not
have to resolve Haworth's inability to afford medically available cor-
rective measures. It is significant, however, that the court took note
of Haworth's inability to pay and declared that Sutton did not address
such a situation. This implies that the court felt that his inability to
pay was a good excuse for not using corrective measures. Further-
more, the court's comments suggest that it thought that inability to
afford corrective measures should not mean that a person conclu-
sively does not have a disability. The comments further suggest that
the court should view these types of cases as different from the Sutton
case. The court did not, however, provide any in-depth rationale for
its finding, nor did it offer any guidance for determining when one
cannot afford to utilize corrective measures.
While other courts have not directly confronted this issue, sev-
eral have indicated a receptiveness to considering economic need as a
basis for evaluating a plaintiff in his unmitigated state. For example,
the Bowers v. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc.72 court held that an em-
ployee who quit taking his anti-depression medication and began
missing work often must be evaluated in his mitigated state because
even though the employee's mental condition substantially limited a
major life activity when he did not take his medication, an employee
"cannot gain ADA protection by unilaterally deciding, without justifi-
cation, not to use prescribed medication which corrects or alleviates
70 Id. at *6.
71 id.
72 No. Civ.A.96-1298-JTM, 1998 WL 856074, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1998).
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his condition., 73 The court did not, however, elucidate what a justifi-
able reason might be because the specific facts in Bowers did not give
rise to one.74
Additionally, courts might be receptive to consideration of eco-
nomic need because they have already expanded the disability deter-
mination concept through the consideration of the aggregate effect of
multiple impairments on an individual. In Creswell v. Deere,75 an
employee defeated his employer's summary judgment motion by
showing that although his asthma and diabetes, when viewed sepa-
rately, did not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activ-
ity, the conditions considered together did.76 Given the expansion of
the ADA disability analysis to encompass cumulative effects, along
with the ADA's intent to remove barriers to employment for people
with disabilities who have historically been economically disadvan-
taged, the courts should also be receptive to considering economic
status as a justifiable reason for evaluating the employee in his un-
mitigated state. Economic status, like multiple impairments, has a
cumulative effect on a disability.
C. Text of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA was passed to "provide a clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities. 77 Although the text of the ADA is silent as to
whether one's economic status should be considered in the disability
determination, several textual provisions implicitly support evaluating
an employee in his unmitigated state if he is unable to afford mitigat-
ing measures.
First, the ADA expressly acknowledges the economic barriers
that people with disabilities have faced by stating that "census data,
national polls, and other studies have documented that people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and
are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and
educationally., 78 The ADA further states that the "Nation's proper
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals., 79 Given the ADA's textual empha-
sis on eliminating economic barriers and promoting self-sufficiency
73 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
74 See id.
7- No. Civ.A.3:96-CV-1392-P., 1997 WL 667928, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 1997).
76 See id. at *24.
77 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
71 Id. § 12101(a)(6) (emphasis added).
79 Id. § 12101(a)(8) (emphasis added).
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for people with disabilities, it is fair to assume Congress did not in-
tend for one's economic inability to utilize mitigating measures to be
a barrier to employment.
The ADA's undue hardship defense 0 also implicitly supports
consideration of economic status. The defense exempts an employer
from making an accommodation if it can show that the accommoda-
tion would cause an undue hardship in light of the employer's overall
financial resources, the nature of the employer's business, and the
type and cost of the needed accommodation. 8' If an employer's eco-
nomic status can exempt it from making an accommodation for the
employee, but the employee's economic status does not also consti-
tute a justifiable reason to evaluate him in his unmitigated state, the
ADA's goal of eliminating economic barriers for people with disabili-
ties would be thwarted. Moreover, it would be unfair for the ADA to
be sensitive to the employer's economic hardship but not those of
people with disabilities whom it seeks to protect.
Finally, the ADA text mandates that the disability determination
be an individualized inquiry by defining the term "disability... with
respect to an individual." 82 This individualized inquiry excludes a per
se or hypothetical disability because people differ in the degree of the
effects of impairments.8 3 Because the ADA demands an individual-
ized inquiry, and one's economic ability to mitigate is part of those
individualized circumstances, a plaintiff's economic ability to miti-
gate must be considered.
D. Legislative History of the ADA
The legislative history of the ADA also supports considering
one's economic inability to utilize mitigating measures as a reason to
evaluate one in his unmitigated state. This support is evinced by the
House Committee Report, which states that "[tihe underlying premise
of [Title I] is that persons with disabilities should not be excluded
g The defense exempts an employer from having to provide a reasonable accommodation
if "such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity" Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
8' Id.§ 12111(10)(B).
82 Id. § 12102(2). Additionally, in order to be disabled under ADA, one must have "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits" a major life activity. Id. Furthermore,
in order to claim ADA protection, one must be a "qualified individual with a disability." Id. §
12111(8) (emphasis added). Moreover, the definition of a qualified individual requires an indi-
vidualized inquiry into whether one can perform the essential functions of the job with or with-
out reasonable accommodation. Il
83 For example, a person with a 10% hearing loss in one ear who can hear normally except
if one is whispering is probably not substantially limited in hearing while a person with a 50%
loss in both ears probably would be substantially limited.
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from job opportunities unless they are actually unable to do the job."84
This premise implicitly rejects the idea that a person's inability to
afford a corrective device should preclude him from being hired if,
despite his impairment, he is able to do the job with reasonable ac-
commodations.
8 5
Additionally, the House Committee Report highlighted congres-
sional intent for the ADA to serve as a vehicle for people with dis-
abilities to overcome barriers and participate in the job market.8 6 The
reports emphasized that many of these barriers "are not inherent in
their disabilities, but arise from barriers that have been imposed ex-
ternally and unnecessarily." 87 Economic disadvantage is one such
external barrier. Consequently, if the court does not consider eco-
nomic need as a justifiable reason to consider an individual in his
unmitigated state even though corrective measures exist, it will ob-
struct the ADA's purpose by allowing economic status to be an un-
necessary external barrier to eligibility. Furthermore, given the
ADA's intent to dismantle physical and social barriers for people with
disabilities, considering economic need as a justifiable reason to
evaluate an individual in his unmitigated state is in keeping with the
spirit of the ADA.
Finally, the House Committee Report emphasized the inferior
economic status that often accompanies people with disabilities, and
the congressional aim to ensure that economic dependency was not an
inevitable consequence of having a disability.88 Therefore, Congress
84 H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 61 (1990). The House Committee Report also stated
that the purpose of the ADA is to bring individuals with disabilities "into the economic and
social mainstream of American life." Id. at 38.
85 While the House Committee Report also states that an economic disadvantage such as
being poor does not, alone, constitute a physical or mental impairment, a poor person who also
has a physical or mental impairment may be considered as having a disability under the ADA.
Id. at 42. Therefore, a person who cannot afford a corrective device and who has a physical or
mental impairment could be disabled under the ADA and should be evaluated in his unmitigated
state.
86 Id. at 58 ("To remove the unnecessary barriers shackling people with disabilities is to
avail our society of the full range of their talents and abilities.") (quoting Justin Dart, Jr.). See
also id. at 59 ('The elimination of these barriers will enable society to benefit from the skills
and talents of persons with disabilities and will enable persons with disabilities to lead more
productive lives.") (quoting Attorney General Thornburgh); id. at 61 ("A break in any link in the
chain that connects individuals with disabilities to the workplace or prevents them from func-
tioning independently creates a barrier which many times cannot be bridged.") (quoting Jay
Rochlin).
7 Id. at 49 (quoting former Senator Lowell Weicker) (emphasis added).
8 For example, the House Committee Report stated:
Historically, the inferior economic and social status of disabled people has been
viewed as an inevitable consequence of the physical and mental limitations im-
posed by disability....
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did not envision that the ADA would be interpreted in such a way that
an individual's economic status could preclude them from the ADA's
protection by forcing an individual to be evaluated in his potentially
mitigatable state, even though he cannot afford to mitigate. This in-
terpretation of the ADA would not protect people with disabilities,
but Would instead perpetuate discrimination against them.
H. SELECTING AN ECONOMIC NEED MODEL
If courts agree that economic need is a justified reason to trigger
an unmitigated ADA disability analysis, the concept of economic
need must then be defined. This raises two issues. First, the parame-
ters of economic hardship must be established. Should it include only
those who cannot afford corrective measures at all, or should it extend
to an individual who cannot afford corrective measures without sell-
ing his car, taking out a second mortgage, or cutting back on his gro-
ceries? Second, what framework should be used for assessing eco-
nomic need? The courts can choose from economic need models,
ranging from simple to complex, used in other areas of the law. While
all these models consider income, financial assets, and financial li-
abilities, they vary in complexity according to the needs of the pro-
gram they serve. Some models sacrifice ease of implementation for
accuracy, while others are less burdensome to implement but are un-
der or over-inclusive in capturing who is economically needy. The
goal of this Note is to choose a model that balances accuracy with
ease of implementation.
In selecting this model, the following factors must be considered.
First, the model should be detailed enough to discern false claims and
help ensure that the non-needy do not abuse the system. Minimally,
this will require some documentation of an individual's income, fi-
The first major challenge to the notion that being disabled meant lifelong
economic dependency was the enactment of the first Rehabilitation Act, the Fess-
Kenyon Act of 1920 ....
From a civil rights perspective, a profound and historic shift in disability
public policy occurred in the 1970s. Through landmark litigation and legislation,
Americans with disabilities were recognized for the first time as a minority group
that was subject to discrimination, and worthy of basic civil rights protections....
The Americans With Disabilities Act completes the circle begun in 1973
with respect to persons with disabilities by extending to them the same civil rights
protections provided to women and minorities beginning in 1964.... The ADA is a
comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation which promises a new future: a fu-
ture of inclusion and integration, and the end of exclusion and segregation.
Id. at 39-41.
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nancial assets, and financial liabilities. At the same time, however,
the process of analyzing this information should not be so complex
that the court cannot assess it without using excessive time and re-
sources. The model must also be flexible enough to allow for the
ADA's mandated individualized assessment. This is particularly im-
portant in light of the varying mitigation costs associated with dis-
abilities. A corrective measure for a person with a hearing impair-
ment could range from $1,000 for a hearing aid to $40,000 for a co-
chlear implant. Therefore, the model selected must be capable of cap-
turing economic need in relation to the variable corrective measures
costs. Finally, the model must be straightforward enough so that once
the economic need determination is made, a meritorious claim is not
tied up in disputes over economic need.
This Section first delineates the boundaries of economic hardship
and then analyzes three available models for determining economic
need:89 complex, balancing analysis, and simple. This Note ultimately
argues that a balancing model such as the ADA in forma pauperis
approach best meets this Note's criterion.
A. Establishing the Parameters of Economic Need
The boundaries of the economic need concept must be estab-
lished before selecting a model for identifying economic need. Should
someone who has a car, but who cannot afford a corrective device, be
forced to sell the car and take public transportation so that he can af-
ford the device? Do we want a person to take a second mortgage out
on his home so that he can acquire it? Should an individual have to
apply for an assistive technology loan in order to utilize mitigating
measures?
This Note argues that the answer to all of these questions is no.
The underlying policy of both the ADA and this Note's economic
need proposal is that a disabled person's economic status should not
be an additional barrier to employment, and he should not have to
incur financial hardship when utilizing mitigating measures. It seems
reasonable to agree that taking out a second mortgage on one's home
in order to afford a corrective device is a financial hardship. Likewise,
it seems unreasonable to expect someone to sell his vehicle and rely
upon public transportation in order to afford a corrective device when
89 A thorough examination of the definition of the poverty concept is beyond the scope of
this note. For a comprehensive discussion of the issue, see MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW
APPROACH (Connie F. Citro & Robert T. Michael, eds. 1995). See also ALDI J.M.
HAGENAARS, PERCEPTION OF POVERTY (1986); PATRICIA RUGGLES, DRAWING THE LINE:
ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
(1990).
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public transportation may be unreliable, unavailable, or burdensome.
Furthermore, an automobile may be an essential part of one's job or
may be essential to arriving on-time for work, and at least one court
has held that promp and regular arrival at work is an essential func-
tion of many jobs.90 The problem, however, arises when someone
owns or leases an expensive car, has investment resources, and then
tries to claim economic hardship.91 But the analytical framework that
this Note proposes for determining economic need disposes of this
problem by weighing vehicles and other assets in the analysis.
Finally, this Note is not arguing that the government or an em-
ployer should provide the employee with the corrective device or
provide financial assistance. Rather, this Note argues that someone
who cannot afford mitigating measures should be evaluated in his
unmitigated state. If this unmitigated state evaluation results in the
employee being classified as disabled under ADA, then the employer
would have to make a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, since
the government is not providing funds or other direct financial assis-
tance to an economically disadvantaged person with a disability,
one's value assessments should not be as closely scrutinized. If an
employee cannot afford a corrective device without incurring some
type of financial hardship, then he should be evaluated in his unmiti-
gated state.
B. Simplified Economic Need Model: Section 8 Housing
Now that the boundaries of economic need have been set, the
courts must devise a method for identifying economic hardship. One
available model is the simplified approach employed by the govern-
ment's assisted housing program. The program's goal is to provide
funds to "assist the several States and their political subdivisions to
remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute
shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower
income." 92 Under the program, eligible families are defined as either
very low-income families whose incomes do not exceed 50% of the
median family income for the area,93 low-income families whose in-
come does not exceed 80% of the median family income for the
9o See Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
9' See infra Part IV.B.
92 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1994).
9 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (1994) ("Tlhe Secretary may establish income ceilings higher
or lower than 50 per centum of the median for the area on the basis of the Secretary's findings
that such variations are necessary because ofunusually high or low family incomes.").
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area,94 or families that qualify to receive vouchers under other federal
programs. 95
While this simplified approach is effective in the housing context
because affordable housing in a region is proportionate to the regional
median income, it may result in an under-inclusive approach in other
contexts. Specifically, this approach will not work in the ADA con-
text because an individual's ability to afford a corrective measure is
not based on his household's percentage of the area median income,
but instead is based on the relation between the household's resources
and the cost of the corrective measure. Therefore, although the simple
model is easy to implement, it is not accurate enough to be used in the
ADA context.
C. Balancing Economic Models: In Forma Pauperis Proceedings &
ADA Undue Hardship
Two judicial balancing approaches to economic need, the in
forma pauperis proceedings and the ADA undue hardship analysis,
are also options for the court. Both models use a balancing approach,
but only the in forma pauperis model requires specific detailed finan-
cial information. The in forma pauperis statute exempts a civil or
criminal litigant from paying administrative court costs if he is unable
to afford the court fees.96 The ADA undue hardship defense exempts
an employer from making a reasonable accommodation for an em-
ployee if the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the ... [em-
ployer's] business." 97 While the concept of undue hardship is not
identical to that of economic need, it does consider the employer's
financial resources, and therefore is relevant to this Note's discussion.
94 Id. ("[T]he Secretary may establish income ceilings higher or lower than 80 per centum
of the median for the area on the basis of the Secretary's findings that such variations are neces-
sary because of prevailing levels of construction costs or unusually high or low family in-
comes.").
95 12 U.S.C. § 4113(0(2) (2000). For example, families may be eligible for vouchers
under Section 4113 if they are "a low-income family; or... a moderate-income family that is:
(I) an elderly family; (I1) a disabled family; or (I) residing in a low-vacancy area;
and...residing in eligible low-income housing on the date of the prepayment of the mortgage or
voluntary termination of the insurance contract." Id.
96 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994). The exact language of the statute states: "Any court of the
United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security
therefor, by a person who makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security
therefor." Id. § 1915(a).
97 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). See also Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44
F.3d 538,542 (7th Cir. 1995).
1052 [V/ol. 52:1033
2002] THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED AND THE ADA
1. In Fonna Pauperis Proceedings
In order to be granted in forma pauperis status, a litigant must
submit to the court a sworn affidavit attesting to his poverty along
with a completed form containing income, asset, and debt informa-
tion.98 Specifically, applicants must provide the following informa-
tion about their assets: total monthly income from employment, avail-
able cash, gifts, alimony, child support, retirement, disability, unem-
ployment, and public assistance. In addition, information is required
about other assets such as homes, real estate, and motor vehicles. The
form also inquires about the applicant's and his/her spouse's em-
ployment history. Also, applicants report the following expense in-
formation: total outstanding debt, number of dependents, average
monthly rent or mortgage, utilities, home maintenance, food, clothing,
laundry, medical, dental, transportation (excluding motor vehicle
payments), recreation and entertainment expenses, all types of insur-
ance, taxes, and alimony or support paid to others.99 The form also
allows the applicant to list any other circumstances explaining why
he/she cannot afford the docket fees for the appeal. 1°
Although the in forma pauperis model contains much of the
same detailed financial information as the complex Food Stamp Act
model, it does not include deduction, exemption, or other mathemati-
cal formulas, and it does not have a minimum threshold income
value. 101 Rather, the court compares the plaintiffs assets with his
liabilities to assess whether the applicant "cannot because of his pov-
erty 'pay or give security for the costs... and still be able to provide'
himself and dependents 'with the necessities of life." ' 1 2  This stan-
dard, however, does not require one to be "wholly destitute."' 0 3 A
applicant's unemployment status, financial liabilities, and lack of
meaningful assets are all common factors of the cases in which in
forma pauperis status was granted.1 4 Furthermore, while courts often
" 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994).
99 28 U.S.C. app. § 4 (1998).
10o Id.
101 See infra Part EI.D fora discussion of the complex food stamp model.
102 Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331,339 (1948).
103 id.
104 See Johnson v. City of Port Arthur, 892 F. Supp. 835, 839 (E.D. Tex. 1995 ) (determin-
ing that an employee who had been unemployed for over a year, received $212 monthly for food
stamps, received government assistance for utility bills, no longer received worker's compensa-
tion, had spent all $3,000 of his retirement plan on living expenses, had a $1,500 van, had no
savings, and who had fallen behind on child support and rent payments, satisfied the in forma
pauperis standard). The ADA courts have also considered factors such as dependents in mak-
ing economic need determinations under the in forma pauperis statute. See Alvarado v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., No. 95-C-7718, 1996 WL 166947, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 1996) (holding that an
unemployed plaintiff with an annual income of $2,900 who had no assets and who "tries to
contribute support to his mother whenever possible" was sufficiently impoverished under the in
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grant poverty status to applicants who lack financial assets, an appli-
cant's showing of some assets is not a bar to poverty status. In
Mathis v. Pete Georges Chevrolet,10 5 the court determined that an
employee who filed a discrimination claim was entitled to in forma
pauperis status because he had been unemployed for almost one year
prior to the commencement of the suit and his sole income was social
security benefits totaling $540 per month. 1 6 The court also noted that
although the employee owned a car and had purchased a $65,000
home, he only had $15,000 in equity and "this financial condition
[was] sufficient to grant... [the.plaintiff's] in forma pauperis applica-
tion." 1
0 7
2. Undue Hardship Analysis
The ADA defines undue hardship as an action requiring "signifi-
cant difficulty or expense" in relation to the following factors: nature
and cost of the accommodation, employer's overall financial re-
sources, including the facility's resources and the headquarter's re-
sources, and the employer's type of operation. 18 In making the undue
hardship determination, many courts focus on the individual em-
ployer's financial situation rather than the general financial situation
of the industry. Thus, what may be a reasonable accommodation for
most employers may be an undue hardship for one specific em-
ployer.
109
This individualized assessment is central to this Note's economic
need analysis. The model's flaw, however, is that while most courts
have alluded to some set of factors to consider in making the undue
hardship determination, the courts have been terse in their reasoning
on the subject. This seems to be due largely to the fact that many
defendants did not present any concrete proof that the accommodation
would create an undue burden and did not engage in any cost-benefit
forma pauperis standard); Richardson v. Draper & Kramer, Inc., No. 95-C-5260. 1995 WL
583923, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1995) (holding that an ADA plaintiff with a lung disease met
the in forma pauperis poverty requirements because he had been unemployed for over a year, he
had no assets, and he supported his wife).
,05 No. 95-C-7938, 1997 WL 85159, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1997).
106 id.
107 id.
,0" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (1994). In addition to the statutory definition of "significant
difficulty or expense," legislative history defines undue hardship as "unduly costly." S. REP.
No. 101-31, at 35 (1989).
109 See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (stat-
ing that the undue hardship analysis "permits an employer to escape liability if he can carry the
burden of proving that a disability accommodation reasonable for a normal employer would
break him"); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that an accommoda-
tion that might be reasonable for the industry as a whole may still create an undue hardship on a
particular employer because of factors unique to that employer's own operation).
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analysis.110 Another complication is that the courts either do not re-
quire the defendant to submit detailed information regarding the em-
ployer's financial resources and liabilities, or the defendant does not
provide the court with such information."' This is problematic be-
cause it does not provide the courts with any guidance as to how to
make the economic need determination, and it can result in less accu-
racy. Additionally, the undue hardship concept extends to non-
economic factors, such as disruption to the employer's other pro-
grams. While this extension is appropriate in the undue hardship
context, it is inappropriate in the disability determination stage where
the goal is to evaluate economic hardship.
D. Complex Economic Model: Food Stamp Program
Another economic need model available to the courts is the gov-
ernment-administered food stamp program.13  The program's pri-
mary purpose is to "promote the general welfare, to safeguard the
health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of
nutrition among low-income households."'" 4 A secondary goal is to
promote employment as the primary route to economic self-
sufficiency."1 To achieve these goals, food stamps are provided to
110 See Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2000) (revers-
ing a grant of summary judgment to the employer because the employer had failed "to produce
at least some modicum of evidence showing that [the requested accommodation] would be a
hardship, financial or otherwise"); Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 720, 741 (D. Md. 1996) (noting that while the defendant was "not required to determine
with mathematical certainty whether the [proposed accommodation] would have caused [the
defendant] an 'undue hardship,' a decision lacking any substantial evidentiary basis whatsoever
is clearly insufficient to support the Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment").
1' See Worthington v. City of New Haven, No. 3:94-CV-00609, 1999 WL 958627, at *12
(D. Conn. Oct. 5, 1999) (holding that the requested accommodation was not an undue hardship
for the employer because "[t]he defendant employs over 500 persons, and while it may not
possess the same financial and personnel resources as a Fortune 500 company, it does retain a
significant financial and personnel base . . . [such that] the relative cost of providing
accommodations to the plaintiff would have been small"). The court, however, did not elaborate
on the type of financial information on which it based its decision. Id.
112 See, e.g., Cehrs v. N.E. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 783 (6th Cir.
1998) (denying summary judgment for the defendant and focusing on factors other than eco-
nomics); Pascuiti v. N.Y. Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that it
would consider the "overall Parks Department budget ... [so that it could] obtain a realistic
picture of the resources available to the City for proposed modifications, while balancing the
cost of those modifications against potential harms to other Parks Department programs"); Mo-
hamed v. Marriott Intl., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 141, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that when consid-
ering the four undue hardship factors, a jury could find that hiring an interpreter or retaining one
for one meeting would not have been an undue di!ficulty or expense) (emphasis added).
"a 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-36 (2000); see also Federal Pell Grants, 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (Supp. V
1999), for an example of another agency program which uses complex economic need formulas
to determine eligibility.
114 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000).
115 See H.R. REP. No. 104-350, at 1943 (1995) (discussing a Senate amendment to make
the program's goal to "support the employment focus and family strengthening mission of pub-
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"households whose incomes and other financial resources... are de-
termined to be a substantial limiting factor in permitting them to ob-
tain a more nutritious diet."'11
6
In light of these goals, a household's eligibility is established by
comparing a household's adjusted income to the national poverty
guidelines, 117 in households whose incomes fall below 100% of the
guidelines are eligible. 118 In order to determine adjusted income, the
household submits annual income, monthly housing or rent expenses,
childcare expenses, dependent care expenses, medical expenses, sav-
ings accounts, retirement accounts, and financial assets informa-
tion.119 The adjusted income is then calculated according to a detailed
series of income exemptions, deductions, and financial asset addi-
tions. 120 There are fifteen exempted categories of income relating to
the program's goal of promoting employment as a means of self-
sufficiency, such as education-related loans, child care expenses, and
government or non-profit energy and self-sufficiency assistance.121
Additionally, the Food Stamp Act contains seven deduction
categories, ranging from a standard deduction to excess shelter ex-
pense deductions, l22 with some of the deductions containing addi-
tional expense exclusions.' 23 The deductions are either assigned a
predetermined value or calculated according to mathematical formu-
las.124 The financial asset computation includes the value of non-
essential items,'25 with a household being ineligible for the program
lic welfare . . programs by facilitating transition to economic self-sufficiency through work,
promoting employment as the primary means of income support and reducing barriers to
employment").
116 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (2000). This closely parallels the goal of this Note. See infra Part
IV.A for a discussion of how this Note's goal is to devise an economic need analysis that deter-
mines when a person's income and other financial resources are a substantial limiting factor in
permitting him to utilize corrective measures to mitigate a disability.
11 The 2000 Poverty Guidelines for the 48 contiguous states are as follows: $8,350 for a
family of 1; $11,250 for a family of 2; $14,150 for a family of 3; $17,050 for a family of 4;
$19,950 for a family of 5; $22,850 for a family of 6; $25,750 for a family of 7; and $28,650 for
a family of 8. See Notice, Annual Update for the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services
Poverty Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg. 7555,7555 (Feb. 15, 2000).
18 See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)(1) (2000).
9 See id. § 2014 (stating that all household income is included except that excluded in §
2014(d)).
12 See id. (dictating formula used).
32 Id. § 2014(d).
322 Id. § 2014(e).
123 For example, the dependent care deduction -excludes expenses paid on behalf of the
household by a third party from the deduction. Id. § 2014 (e)(3)(B).
124 Id. § 2014(e). A pre-assigned deduction example is the standard deduction, which
ranges from $118 to $269, depending on the household's geographic location. Id. § 2014(e)(1).
An example of a calculated deduction is the earned income deduction, calculated as 20 percent
ofall earned income. Id. § 2014(e)(2).
125 This includes items such as recreational boats, snowmobiles, airplanes, vacation homes,
vacation mobile homes, any licensed vehicle whose fair market value exceeds $4,650 and that is
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if its resources exceed $2,000 per year. 26 Once the individual ex-
emptions, deductions, and additions are determined, they are added
together to obtain the final adjusted household income.
IV. USING THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS MODEL TO DETERMINE
ECONOMIC NEED: A MODIFIED PROPOSAL
Overall, the ADA in forma pauperis model, with its weighing
analysis of detailed financial information, seems to be an ideal bal-
ance between accuracy and simplicity of implementation. This Sec-
tion, therefore, advocates that the in forma pauperis balancing ap-
proach be used. The model that this Note proposes, however, varies
from the in forma pauperis model in two ways. First, it advocates that
a variation of the undue hardship factors should be considered in the
analysis. Second, it argues that a different standard should be used to
determine economic need. The balancing analysis and the level of
detail required, however, is the same as the in forma pauperis model.
This Section explains the scope of these two modifications, as well as
why they are necessary in the ADA context. Additionally, it outlines
the application of the model. Finally, the Section explores the impli-
cations of considering economic need in the ADA context. Will this
consideration subject the courts to a flood of new ADA cases? Will
this model result in disincentives to utilize corrective measures?
Does it lead to unfair results between ADA plaintiffs with the same
disability but different economic statuses? Is consideration of a plain-
tiff's economic need an unfair burden on the employer?
A. Slight Modifications to the In Forma Pauperis Economic Need
Model
This Note advocates that the in forma pauperis economic need
model be used to determine economic hardship in the ADA disability
analysis, with two modifications. First, the in forma pauperis re-
quirement that the litigant not be able to afford the court costs without
being unable to support his family would not be used. This standard
eliminates individuals whose financial status is a substantial limiting
factor to obtaining corrective measures, but for whom financial status
is not a complete bar from the economic need concept. A person who
could afford to pay for court costs if he took public transportation for
a year would presumably be ineligible for in forma pauperis status
used for household transportation or to obtain or continue employment, and any savings or
retirement account. Id. § 2014(g).
126 Id. § 2014(g)(1). Assets may not exceed $3,000 per year for households with a member
who is 60 years or older. The financial asset computations also include exemptions for vehicles
necessary to earn income, family burial plots, and non-liquid resources. Id. § 2014(g).
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because he could still support his family. Therefore, a different stan-
dard is needed. Second, the test would incorporate factors similar to
the undue hardship factors in the balancing analysis. While these fac-
tors are arguably already implicitly considered during the in forma
pauperis proceedings, they should explicitly be considered in order to
ensure greater accuracy. Furthermore, consideration of the undue
hardships will help achieve an individualized inquiry. The factors also
help ensure that the model is flexible enough to account for the vary-
ing costs of mitigating measures and other factors, such as living in a
high rent area, affecting a person's ability to afford a corrective meas-
ure.
With these considerations in mind, the judicial rule that this Note
proposes is that one who meets the other criteria for being disabled
under the ADA should be evaluated in his unmitigated state when his
income and other financial resources are determined to be a substan-
tial limiting factor in permitting him to utilize existing mitigating
measures. 127  To determine if the plaintiff is economically needy,
the courts should employ a balancing test similar to the in forma pau-
peris model, which also considers the following factors: (1) the nature
and cost of the corrective device or mitigating measure needed, (2)
the overall financial resources of the plaintiff, (3) proportion of finan-
cial resources that must be expended in order to utilize corrective
measures, and (4) any other special circumstances affecting the plain-
tiff's ability to afford mitigating measures.
B. Applying the Balancing Approach
To assert a claim of economic need, an ADA plaintiff must sub-
mit an affidavit and application listing his income, assets, and liabili-
ties as required in the in forma pauperis form.12 Once the court has
this information, the first factor it should examine is the cost of the
mitigating measure, with the actual expenditure being calculated. For
an employee who does not buy medication because he cannot afford
it, the corrective device cost should be based on its expected cost.
The determination of the second factor, overall financial resources,
should be made by evaluating the information provided in the eco-
nomic need application.129
127 This is similar to the purpose of the Food Stamp Act. See supra Part lI.D for a discus-
sion of the purpose of the Food Stamp Act.
128 See 28 U.S.C. app. § 4 (Supp. V 1999).
129 Id. Specifically, the elements the court should consider are total monthly income from
employment, gifts, alimony, child support, retirement, disability, unemployment, and public
assistance, the litigant's and his/her spouse's employment history, the amount of cash the liti-
gant has in a bank account or otherwise, assets such as homes, real estate, motor vehicles, debt
owed, number of dependents, average monthly expenses including rent or home-mortgage pay-
1058 [Vol. 52:1033
2002] THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED AND THE ADA
The court should next look at the proportion of resources that
must be expended to utilize corrective measures in comparison to the
available resources. The guiding principle behind calculating this
proportion is determining whether one is substantially limited in his
ability to utilize mitigating measures based on his overall financial
resources. There is no set threshold for this determination because,
given the unique circumstances of each household, including house-
hold size, 30% of one household's financial resources could be sub-
stantially limiting, while only 10% of financial resources could be
substantially limiting for another household. It would not be fair,
therefore, to have a bright line rule. Furthermore, plaintiffs may incur
substantially different costs in mitigating an impairment because the
types of disabilities vary widely. For example, a plaintiff may have
$2,000 in resources but may need to spend $20,000 or more on a
mitigating measure whereas another plaintiff only needs to spend
$2,000 on a mitigating measure. This again achieves the ADA's
mandate for an individualized inquiry.
Finally, the courts should consider special circumstances in mak-
ing the financial need determination. It is unreasonable, for example,
to classify a single householder who earns $27,000 a year, and who
has "money available from investment dividends, his state Public
Employees Retirement System contributions, and ... drives a 2000
Chevrolet Blazer that he leases for $255 a month," as substantially
limited in his ability to utilize mitigating measures. 130 In this case, the
court could decline to find economic need.
Under this factor, the court could also consider the fact that a
plaintiff has four children, is a single parent, and pays $400 a month
for an unheated room 131 in the high-price real estate area of Silicon
Valley, California, where "'poor' means a family of four scraping by
on $53,100 a year or an individual earning less than $37,200. ' '132 The
ment, utilities, home maintenance, food, clothing, laundry and dry-cleaning, medical and dental
expenses, transportation (excluding motor vehicle payments), recreation and entertainment, all
types of insurance, taxes, any mortgage payments, and alimony or support paid to others. Il
130 Editorial, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, Oct. 13, 2000, at A4 (opining that a local Com-
mon Pleas Court judge was correct in refusing to find a criminal defendant indigent).
131 See Martha Mendoza, Silicon Valley's Poor People Definitely Not in the Chips, FORT
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Feb. 14, 1999, at 33 (noting that Connie Tort, a 25-year-old single
mother of four, spends $400 a month for an unheated room).
132 See Evelyn Nieves, $53,000 and Homeless Social Issues: In Silicon Valley, Workers
Making What Would Be a Good Wage Elsewhere are Struggling, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb.
20, 2000, at A4. The article also notes that in Silicon Valley, the median home price is
$410,000, an average two-bedroom apartment costs $1,700 per month, and studio apartments
cost over $1,000 per month. Id. See also Randi Feigenbaum, Rising Cost of Renting on Long
Island, NEWSDAY, Sept. 10, 1999, at A7 (reporting that a person would have to earn three times
the minimum wage to afford a one-bedroom apartment in Long Island); Martin Miller, In a Bind
as Rents Go Through the Roof. LA. Renters Seek Roommates, Use Up Their Savings-Or are
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court may deem this plaintiff, because of special circumstances, to be
economically disadvantaged.
C. Why Complex Economic Need Models Such As the Food Stamp
Act Would Be Inappropriate
Although the complex economic need model and the in forma
pauperis model are similar, only the in forma pauperis balancing ap-
proach allows the court to assess the information without using time-
consuming mathematical formulas or lengthy deductions and exemp-
tions. Furthermore, the in forma pauperis model is flexible enough to
achieve the ADA's mandated individualized inquiry. The complex
model, with its reliance on the poverty guidelines as a minimum
threshold income level, is too rigid to achieve an individualized in-
quiry. The minimum poverty guidelines, for example, do not vary
geographically.1 33 Housing costs, however, can vary geographically,
and a household in a high rent area of the country could have a calcu-
lated income greater than the poverty guideline but still struggle to
obtain a corrective measure because of the high housing costs.
Also, due to the varying nature of disabilities, the complex
model's rigidity may eliminate some needy households if applied in
the ADA context. People may make more than the poverty guideline
income but still may be economically disadvantaged because of the
expenses incurred in mitigating their impairment. For example, Sarah
and Robert Bergeon have a fixed $21,000 annual income, of which
$6,500 (approximately one-third) is spent on prescription drugs for
heart disease, diabetes, gout, and high blood pressure.134 The Ber-
geons are covered by Medicare, but Medicare does not cover pre-
scription drugs. 135 Under the 2000 Poverty Guidelines, a two-person
household is poor if its annual income is $11,250 or below. 136 There-
fore, the Bergeons would not qualify as poor. But expending one-
Simply Shut Out, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999, at El (reporting that high housing rents make
affordable housing difficult to find for low-income and middle-income working families);
Charles Piller, High-Tech Model of Inconsistency Quality of life: Community is Plagued By a
Gap Between Haves and Have-Nots Involving Housing, Jobs and Other Issues, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1999, at C3 (noting that the median area income of $74,000 could afford only 39.8% of
Silicon Valley housing).
133 See Notice, Annual Update of the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services Poverty
Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg. 7555, 7555 (Feb. 15, 2000).
134 See David Noonan, Wy Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22.
Heart disease, diabetes, and high blood pressure can be disabilities under the ADA if they sub-
stantially limit a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
135 See Noonan, supra note 134, at 24.
136 See Notice, Annual Update of the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services Poverty
Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg. at 7555.
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third of one' s income on medication would substantially affect one's
ability to use mitigating measures.
The food stamp formula also fails to account for government as-
sistance in its income calculation. 137 A household with an income
below the poverty level that receives government assistance may still
be able to afford a corrective device, however, because of the extra
income the government assistance provides. Additionally, while the
complex deduction, exemption, and asset formula is justified in the
context of the Food Stamp Program because it is a means to accu-
rately assess a household's ability to obtain a nutritional diet so that
tax-payer funds are used only to help the needy, such a degree of ac-
curacy is not needed here. Rather, just requiring the detailed financial
information to be submitted is sufficient here to help prevent abuse by
the non-needy. Furthermore, many of the food stamp exemptions and
deduction formulas are related to the program's goal of promoting
employment as a means of self-sufficiency and ensuring that people
are not penalized for obtaining employment. As the Court's goal is to
determine if one cannot afford a corrective measure, the complex de-
ductions and exemption formulas are not needed.
D. Will Consideration of Economic Need Lead to Fraudulent
Claims?
A historical concern with any legal determination based upon
economic need has been to ensure that the non-needy do not abuse the
system, and to deal with people who may be disinclined to pay for
mitigating measures. 138 Should someone who pays $250 monthly to
lease a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer, has two televisions, and cable televi-
sion, but who alleges he cannot afford to utilize a mitigating measure,
be considered economically disadvantaged? Here it is doubtful that
the court would tolerate this abuse of the system. First, based on the
existing case law, although the court has not elucidated what a justi-
fied reason for not utilizing an existing mitigating measure is, it has
117 See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(2)(A) (2000) (excluding income from support programs attrib-
utable to public assistance from applicants' earned income figures).
138 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-464, at 2 (1977) (stating that one objective in amending the
Food Stamp Act of 1964 was to "eliminate the non-needy from the program so that those who
do not need food stamps do not get them"); ROBERT RECTOR ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUNDA-
TION BACKGROUNDER No. 791, How "PoOR" ARE AMERICA'S POOR? (1990), available at
http.//www.heritage.org/library/categories/healthwel/bg791.html. The Heritage Report's au-
thors argue that the Census Bureau's methodology for determining poverty should be abolished
and replaced with different standards because under that methodology, 62% of "poor" house-
holds own a car, with 14% owning two or more cars, almost half of all "poor" households have
air-conditioning, 31% have microwave ovens, and 22,000 "poor" households have heated swim-
ming pools or Jacuzzis. Id.
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clearly stated that a plaintiff must have a justified reason. 139 Claiming
economic hardship to make an employer pay for a reasonable ac-
commodation rather than paying for the corrective measure oneself is
not a justified reason. Furthermore, courts can employ a device simi-
lar to the in forma pauperis dismissal clause' 4° to help deter the filing
of false indigence claims and frivolous claims. Under this clause,
cases will be dismissed if the court determines that the plaintiff lied
about being poor, the suit is frivolous or malicious, or is non-
meritorious. 141 While no system is foolproof, this will help deter false
claims.
E. Consideration of Plaintiffs Economic Need Does Not Unfairly
Burden the Employer
Another set of questions arising from the consideration of eco-
nomic need in the ADA disability determination relates to the em-
ployer's burden. Does consideration of economic need unduly burden
an employer? Is it fair to make the employer absorb these costs? Is
the employer better able to absorb and spread the cost of the accom-
modation than the individual who has to go into debt to pay for a
mitigating measure?
This Note argues that consideration of economic need in the dis-
ability determination does not place an undue burden on the employer
because the employer is not expected to pay for the corrective meas-
ure, it is only expected to make a reasonable accommodation. This is
the same burden that the employer already bears under the current
ADA disability analysis. Furthermore, consideration of economic
need only gets the plaintiff past the summary judgment stage. He
must still prove his case in order for the employer to bear the respon-
sibility of making a reasonable accommodation. Additionally, the
employer is still entitled to the undue hardship defense if it can show
that providing the reasonable accommodation would cause an undue
financial hardship. 142 Recent studies have suggested that the em-
ployer's average cost of accommodation is only $45.143 Studies have
also shown that both employees with and without disabilities benefit
from the accommodations that the employer makes for the employee
139 See Bowers v. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc., No. Civ.A.96-1298-JTM, 1998 WL
856074, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1998) (holding that "[t]he plaintiff cannot gain ADA protection
by unilaterally deciding, without justification, not to use prescribed medication which corrects
or alleviates his condition").
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
141 See id.
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
143 See Berven & Blanck, supra note 22, at 65 (citing Sears study that from 1990-1997 the
employer's average cost for accommodations was $45).
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with a disability. These benefits may be in the form of increased em-
ployee satisfaction, safety, or convenience.144 Customers also benefit
from increased safety and convenience. Therefore, the employer may
get unexpected benefits from making the accommodation.
Finally, since employers typically will have greater financial re-
sources than an individual employee, employers may be better finan-
cially able to make a reasonable accommodation than an employee
who cannot afford to use mitigating measures without incurring fi-
nancial hardship. Furthermore, the employer may be able to spread
the cost to consumers. Therefore, it seems especially desirable to ex-
pect an employer to make the reasonable accommodation for an eco-
nomically disadvantaged individual.
F. Courts Will Not Be Faced with a Flood of Additional ADA
Litigation
Courts will not be subjected to a flood of new ADA litigation by
considering economic need in the disability determination. While the
Sutton decision limited the number of suits filed under the ADA's
disability prong, it did not foreclose suits filed under the "regarded
as" or "record of' prongs of the ADA. 45 Additionally, ADA plain-
tiffs may argue that even with their corrective measures, they have a
disability because they are still substantially limited in a major life
activity. Litigants may also argue that the side effects of the mitigat-
ing measures result in the substantial impairment of a major life activ-
ity.'4 Therefore, non-impoverished ADA plaintiffs have alternative
avenues of litigation and would not need to rely on an economic need
claim.
Furthermore, this proposal balances the ADA's goal of enabling
people with disabilities to have access to the labor market without
flooding the courts with frivolous litigation because only the most
severely disabled or most severely economically disadvantaged will
incur severe financial hardship, and they are the ones most need the
ADA's protection.
44 See !& at 64-65.
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining a disability as "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; ... a
record of such impairment; ... or being regarded as having such an impairment"). For a discus-
sion of these provisions, see infra Part IV.G.
146 See McGarity, supra note 13 (arguing that in the wake of the Sutton decision, ADA
plaintiffs will shift their focus to arguing that the side effects of their mitigating measures sub-
stantially impair a major life activity).
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G. Consideration of Economic Need Will Not Produce Unfair Results
Does it makes sense to provide one plaintiff with ADA protec-
tion because he cannot afford his prosthetic arm but to deny another
plaintiff ADA protection because he pays for his prosthesis or be-
cause it is covered by insurance? 147 In the broad scheme of the ADA,
with its goal of eliminating external barriers to employment, this dis-
tinction makes sense when economic disadvantage is preventing the
first plaintiff, who is as equally qualified as the second plaintiff, from
entering the labor force. Furthermore, while the second plaintiff
whose prosthesis is covered by insurance does not get a reasonable
accommodation from his employer and the first plaintiff does, this is
fair because the first plaintiff does not need an accommodation since
he has a prosthetic device.
Also, the employee who can afford to pay is not completely
eliminated from ADA protection. He may qualify as disabled under
the ADA's "regarded as" or "record of' prongs. 148 The "regarded as"
prong provides an employee who does not have disability protection
from an employer who nonetheless views the employee as having a
disability.149 In EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines,150 a morbidly obese fe-
male applicant for a bus driving position successfully sued the bus
lines after it refused to hire her because it believed she would be un-
able to move quickly in an emergency.15 1 The court held that the
woman had satisfied the "regarded as" prong because she presented
evidence that the bus line viewed her as having a perceived disability
in that it believed she would not be able to move quickly in an emer-
gency due to her weight.15 2  Therefore, a person with a prosthesis
would also be able to sue an employer who viewed the employee as
having a disability because of his prosthesis.
Additionally, while Sutton may have limited a disabled person's
chances of success under the disabled prong, the "record of' prong of
the ADA is still available to litigants. 53 This provision of the ADA
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee who has a history of or has been misclassified as having a dis-
147 See Isaac S. Greaney, The Practical Impossibility of Considering the Effect of Mitigat-
ing Measures Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 FORDHAM URB. LJ.,
1267, 1295 (1999) (arguing that covering plaintiff I and not plaintiff 2 because plaintiff 1 does
not pay for the prosthetic arm "makes little sense").
l48 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
149 See id.
IS0 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
151 See id. at 979 (holding that such belief was wholly unreasonable).
152 See id. at 976.
1-" See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (listing three prongs for defining a disability).
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ability.1m An employee who had previously been hospitalized with
tuberculosis would fall under this provision. 155  A person who re-
cently acquires a prostheses may be also able to sue on the basis of
having had a disability prior to acquiring the prostheses.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton has the potential to ex-
pose courts to ADA plaintiffs who cannot afford to utilize mitigating
measures. This Note argues that an ADA plaintiff who, due to eco-
nomic hardship, cannot afford to utilize mitigating measures should
be evaluated in his unmitigated state during the disability analysis.
This result is supported by the Sutton decision itself, the text of the
ADA, and the legislative history of the ADA. Furthermore, the courts
should use a modified version of the ADA in forma pauperis model,
which considers the cost of the mitigating measure in comparison to
the plaintiff's overall financial resources, to determine who is eco-
nomically disadvantaged. Using this model, the courts will be able to
effect the purpose of the ADA to remove barriers to employment for
persons with disabilities, while also maintaining the ADA's mandate
of individualized inquiry.
CHRISTINE M. TOMKOt
'54 See 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(k) (2001).
155 See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (holding that a
school teacher's hospitalization 20 years ago for tuberculosis sufficed to show a record of im-
pairment).
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